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Security Politics

Top Voting Machine Vendor Admits It Installed Remote-Access Software on Systems Sold to States (vice.com) 244

Kim Zetter, reporting for Motherboard: The nation's top voting machine maker has admitted in a letter to a federal lawmaker that the company installed remote-access software on election-management systems it sold over a period of six years, raising questions about the security of those systems and the integrity of elections that were conducted with them. In a letter sent to Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) in April and obtained recently by Motherboard, Election Systems and Software acknowledged that it had "provided pcAnywhere remote connection software ... to a small number of customers between 2000 and 2006," which was installed on the election-management system ES&S sold them.

The statement contradicts what the company told me and fact checkers for a story I wrote for the New York Times in February. At that time, a spokesperson said ES&S had never installed pcAnywhere on any election system it sold. "None of the employees -- including long-tenured employees, has any knowledge that our voting systems have ever been sold with remote-access software," the spokesperson said. ES&S did not respond on Monday to questions from Motherboard, and it's not clear why the company changed its response between February and April. Lawmakers, however, have subpoena powers that can compel a company to hand over documents or provide sworn testimony on a matter lawmakers are investigating, and a statement made to lawmakers that is later proven false can have greater consequence for a company than one made to reporters.

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Top Voting Machine Vendor Admits It Installed Remote-Access Software on Systems Sold to States

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  • Not a big deal (Score:3, Interesting)

    by Train0987 ( 1059246 ) on Wednesday July 18, 2018 @10:48AM (#56968170)

    It's plausible that an admin or tech installed it for convenience at certain trouble customers and current execs just weren't aware. It doesn't mean they lied. This was 15-20 years ago. Pretty common practice.

    • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday July 18, 2018 @11:47AM (#56968640)

      Reading up on verified paper voting trails. (=My personal wishlist item for verifiable elections) reveals some disturbing stuff from 2016's election:

      https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/paperless-pennsylvania-can-swing-state-verify-2016-vote-n660266

      "Even benign breakdowns of aging equipment — 43 states have machines that are more than a decade old ", i.e. states with voting machines from before 2006, the new standards didn't come in until 2007 and ESS only removed this software on machines made AFTER 2007.

      You claimed it was 15-20 years ago, but the article says 2007 was the time they removed them and then only for new voting machines sold.

      "when Pennsylvanians go to the polls to elect a new president in a month, more than 80 percent of them will be using machines that don't have a paper-backed audit."

      Let me guess, Pennsylvania was polling strongly for Clinton yet elected Trump by a slim and plausible margin.
      "Hillary Clinton leading by up to 12 points in Pennsylvania..."
      (From Wikipedia after the article)
      Trump wins Pennsylvania by 48.18% to 47.46%...

      I'm guessing that this is odd.
      2012, strong Obama, 2008 strong Obama, 2004 kerry, 2000 Al Gore....

      Yeh right, and now you can't even verify it because you didn't have a paper trail to verify against.

      FFS,

      • Most voting equipment is decades old. It's very expensive and rarely used. Not to mention the training involved for mostly elderly volunteers. The more complicated you make the voting machines, the more tax dollars are needed to buy/maintain and the less reliable they will be for the workers volunteering to run them. I've been involved with voting technology since the mid 1990's and as a professional I would LOVE to go back to the old manual pull-lever machines whose results are then carried by hand to c

    • by GrumpySteen ( 1250194 ) on Wednesday July 18, 2018 @11:57AM (#56968742)

      Voting machines decide who gets a huge amount of power in our government. Backdoor access via a software package whose source code had been leaked and exploited, leading to the manufacturer recommending that it be removed, is huge goddamn deal.

    • It's pretty common practice in your country that machines with highly sensitive areas of operation don't get audited for such common things like blatantly obvious backdoors and deliberately installed remote control software?

      Remind me to never use an ATM in the US.

      • No, sadly its this kind of misinformation meant to reinforce a false belief in election-rigging that's become common practice.

        • Re:Not a big deal (Score:4, Insightful)

          by Opportunist ( 166417 ) on Wednesday July 18, 2018 @01:01PM (#56969244)

          Even more of a reason to dump those voting machines.

          People pretty much have to trust paper and pencil. It's something everyone understands and trying to spin some conspiracy of how someone "stole" the election is pretty hard that way.

          That gets way easier with a tool that few people understand, even fewer can audit and only a handful actually get anywhere close to actually auditing it.

    • by rsborg ( 111459 )

      If any system should be "airgapped" it's one the controls the political levers to the biggest market in the world.
      I mean, which black hat wouldn't want to game that system?

      • I mean, which black hat wouldn't want to game that system?

        Judging by the news, quite a few Red Hats are interested in it also.

  • Garbage systems. (Score:5, Insightful)

    by Gravis Zero ( 934156 ) on Wednesday July 18, 2018 @10:48AM (#56968172)

    If your electronic voting booth runs a commercial operating system then you have already failed to secure your systems.

    • Meh - security-by-obscurity isn't quite the answer. A properly stripped, hardened and configured *nix kernel could secure things more than well enough, and require a lot less effort, money, time, etc. At least, as long as you keep up on patches, but that would be the case on any properly-maintained uber-proprietary OS.

      • by sinij ( 911942 )
        What you say is superficially reasonable and my work the first time around. Once it is known what flavor/distro is used in these voting machines, APTs will insert hard to detect flaws to be exploited.

        It is quite possible to intentionally introduce an exploitable bug [underhanded-c.org] without it looking like sabotage.
        • You could use Minix 3. The kernel itself is tiny; and each part is isolated, so auditable individually. High-level certification is fairly doable; more to the point, you can audit the outside-controllable path and strip out things you don't need.

          For a touch screen voting machine, you'll need graphical display, touch screen input, and disk access. That means file systems. It means the capacity to run and schedule processes. It means the capacity to manage memory.

          It doesn't mean BFQ and anticipatory

          • by dj245 ( 732906 )
            You're really relying on the vendor to technically know what they are doing. Our company has been trying to win some government work in the past few months. We know we are technically competent but we are totally outclassed by the vendors who know how to game the system- getting their proprietary specs into the RFP, forcing numerous addendums to be issued so that small competitors (us) can't keep up with all the changes, etc.

            In our core business, our customers are wise to these practices and don't put u
            • No, I'm simply pointing out the theoretical capacity to produce something of some measure of security.

              I'd like a full brief on these practices and how they differ between the public and private markets, ready for public release, with case studies and recommendations. Salient details and the limited discussion necessary to explain them. This is one facet of government I'd like to see nailed down once and for all, and nobody has stepped up to make it a major issue because we're all more concerned about g

          • by hey! ( 33014 ) on Wednesday July 18, 2018 @05:10PM (#56970622) Homepage Journal

            You are talking about software engineering approaches to securing the system. Those are important, but the overall system design has to be secure, otherwise it doesn't matter how secure the operating system is.

            A better approach would be to have the system print out human readable, machine readable paper ballots, which the voter carries from the voting booth to a secure ballot box. This wouldn't prevent the machine from mismarking ballots, but there would be a high probability of someone detecting an effort large enough to swing an election.

      • by zifn4b ( 1040588 )
        No offense but I think you two are thinking at a level of detail that while admirable isn't necessarily. The simple truth is: the voting machine shouldn't be connected to a network at all including the internet. It should also be in a secure location and tamper-proof like an HSM (Hardware Security Module). Unauthorized tampering fries the machine. If you want to get super serious about security, check FIPS [wikipedia.org]. To give you an idea, a credit card transaction processing system must meet the FIPS Level 3 stan
    • If your electronic voting booth runs a commercial operating system then you have already failed to secure your systems.

      Yes and no. An electronic voting booth running a commercial operating system can be reasonably secure if it's not accessible from the Internet or if it uses security software and VPN technology for all communication. That being said, all electronic systems running an OS are vulnerable to having malware loaded locally. Once a bad actor has physical access to anything (i,e. through local access, social engineering, etc.) then all bets are off.

      The only way to be sure is to have a paper trail. If you're goi

    • Why does it even have an operating system. It's not as if it needs to be able to double as a word processor or run the occasional spreadsheet. It is a single purpose device that could run a fairly simple state-machine, a few hundred lines of C.

      There may well be a complex system that loads the ballot rules into it, but after that its job is just to accept input on some push buttons, light a few lights, spit out a little record on its serial port to a printer and move on.

      Hell, its "display" could be just a f

  • The big heist (Score:5, Insightful)

    by paiute ( 550198 ) on Wednesday July 18, 2018 @10:49AM (#56968184)
    The Man finally figured out that stealing money is for chumps. The best crime is to steal the whole country.
    • The best crime is to steal the whole country.

      . . . even better would be . . . stealing someone else's country . . .

      Whether that can be done is still open for debate.

    • by hey! ( 33014 )

      The Man finally figured out that stealing money is for chumps. The best crime is to steal the whole country.

      That trains has left the station, because of lobbying.

      If you as a voter sell your vote, that's a crime. If the person you vote for sells his votes in Congress, that's constituent services.

  • "provided pcAnywhere remote connection software ... to a small number of customers between 2000 and 2006,"

    The same PCAnywhere that was so egregiously exploitable that Symantec - Symantec of all companies, gave out free copies of version 12 to users who owned literally any prior version no matter how old it was? THAT is the product that was being utilized on voting machines?!

    It has become abundantly clear that any company selling technology-based solutions to the government which can successfully win a bid should under no circumstances be allowed to do the job.

    • I'm working out a parliamentary voting system that I want to publish as open source. I'm even considering it on a government scale, with integrity and verifiability. The concerns are interesting and important; of course, that happens when your first concern is security.
      • Now where is the kickback in that?

        • by Opportunist ( 166417 )

          Now where is the kickback in that?

          Username checks out.

        • I'm pushing for voting systems that are stable and democratic--systems like Schulze and Ranked Pairs. Providing software and systems to handle the votes and give the public a means of validation has a political impact.

          My state got rid of its voting machines and went to paper ballots. Each ballot went into a machine for scanning. Even with a recount by hand, I question if the human election staff ever misread a vote due to fatigue and routine. Do they miscount? County Executive went to Johnny Olszews

    • in a case like this I'm willing to chalk it up to malice. After all, you just have to control who counts the votes...
  • Primal scream (Score:5, Informative)

    by Catbeller ( 118204 ) on Wednesday July 18, 2018 @11:20AM (#56968472) Homepage

    I TOLD YOU SO GOD DAMN IT.

    Why would you assume they wouldn't install a backdoor? WHY??? Changing election totals gave them trillions of dollars in tax cuts and complete power.
    Don't talk about open-source replacements. Any solution with electrons will be hacked and controlled. Go back to paper, the way Canada does, or did before the Tories rammed e-voting in. I wonder why, I wonder.

    • by gtall ( 79522 )

      Ah, the mythical "they". "They" seem to be capable of all sorts of things, collecting trillions of dollars, complete power. No one can compete with "they". Way to inflate a molehill into a mountain. This is one tiny voting machine company. You should work for Fox.

    • Re: (Score:3, Funny)

      by Gilgaron ( 575091 )
      In their defense, they thought the backdoor was secure because it only took Cyrillic characters for input.
    • by pz ( 113803 )

      Mechanical voting machines. That's the answer. Incredibly difficult to hack on a widespread basis. Essentially impossible to hack remotely.

      Can't fix the old ones? Bunk. Re-tooling is not just eminently possible, 3d printing makes it nearly trivial.

    • that wants e-voting without a paper trail. Always in the name of fiscal austerity...
    • Re:Primal scream (Score:4, Insightful)

      by hey! ( 33014 ) on Wednesday July 18, 2018 @05:28PM (#56970718) Homepage Journal

      Paper ballots with machine tallying combines the most of the best features of both systems and is cheap, logistically simple, and auditable. It also scales with license or technical limitations. I live in a state which uses that system and if turnout is heavy at the polling place they just set up another row of cheap pop-up voting booths, doubling the polling place's throughput for less than a price of a single voting machine.

      Of course one man's bug is sometimes another man's feature.

      I'm convinced that the reason these machines are so popular despite their cost, insecurity, and logistical burden is that they enable political parties to manipulate election results, not by hacking, but simply using the bottleneck they represent to generate long lines in precincts unfavorable to them.

  • They put PCAnywhere on the MANAGEMENT systems on a few customer's systems. This was NOT on voting machines.

    Folks do need to realize that this risk pretty much requires internet access and requires firewall access rules that allow it. This is not some huge risk and is easily mitigated by your standard network firewall configuration. Your home router would be sufficient to prevent unauthorized access using PCAnywhere. Big woop.

    So why did the story change? Because, it wasn't part of the normal systems

  • by AmazingRuss ( 555076 ) on Wednesday July 18, 2018 @11:47AM (#56968646)

    We are subjects, and we have no control.... if we ever did.

  • So, are they saying the electronic voting machines, the scanner machines... or are they talking about the systems that the votes are uploaded *to*?

    The last would make the most sense... and why change individual votes, when you can change the uploaded vote data files, and thus change the totals, via that one system?

    This damn well ought to be jail time for the CEO.

  • by Anonymous Coward

    Careful, you might not like what you find!

    If we start really looking at these voting machines, we'll soon uncover the Diebold CEO's comments promising to deliver the 2004 election to George W. Bush (specifically Ohio, which they did, and which deviated from exit poles with huge sample bases- by a whopping 6% -- a wide enough margin to trigger new elections in other countries like the Ukraine, but mysteriously not in Ohio). It is likely we'll find many state and local elections have been "stolen," and proba

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