No Hand Counting of Electronic Votes 56
In the Washington state gubernatorial election, the hand recount has begun, and Snohomish County -- which had nearly 100K votes cast on Sequoia electronic voting machines -- won't have to print up and count them all by hand, as had been previously thought by county officials. Instead, they will print up the totals from each of the 937 machines, and compare those to the grand total. (The statewide hand recount is expected to complete before Christmas, modulo court challenges.)
That wouldn't matter anyway (Score:5, Insightful)
There is no way to recount the electronic "votes"
It does matter. (Score:3, Insightful)
Hypothetical scenarios:
If the voters are stupid, then they'd print everything out and do a full manual recount.
If they are very stupid, then they'd do this.
If they are completely stupid, there wouldn't be a recount.
The end objective is to convince the voters that everything is fine and they can resume their normal programming.
Re:It does matter. (Score:3)
Re:It does matter. (Score:2)
They think the voters are too stupid (or apathetic) to realize it is technically pointless[1].
The method of recount they picked is just a matter of _how_ stupid/apathetic they think the voters are.
Re:It does matter. (Score:2)
I had to cringe when the lady at the polling place said, "This machine is not connected to the Internet, and there's no modem, so there's no hacking at all. When the first voter came in, I printed out a zero tally tape and showed it to the voter to make sure there were no votes already in the machine."
First of all, why should I trust her that she actually did this zeroing out of the machine... on her word? And second, how do I trust that the first voter actually
What!? (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:What!? (Score:3, Funny)
Daniel
You're not being dense (Score:3, Informative)
Re:What!? (Score:2)
1. It doesn't
2. Not dense at all (see the Insightful mod)
3. It won't
-and sorry, but I can't resist-
4. You must be new here
Re:What!? (Score:2)
Re:What!? (Score:2)
Re:What!? (Score:2)
Re:What!? (Score:2)
Presumably -- and all evidence I've seen points this direction -- the totals each machine prints up would be identical to the number of "ballots" for each candidate the machines would print up, if done individually.
The idea is simply that printing and adding the votes by hand would be a. a waste of time, b. a waste of money, and
Re:What!? (Score:2)
Re:What!? (Score:2)
Re:What!? (Score:2)
Well... (Score:2)
Well, if the machine gives a substantially different total than before, you've definitely got a problem that would matter! Using this a test for vote tampering is likely to have a very high false negative rate, but a very low false positve. Not massively useful, but not completely useless.
Re:What!? (Score:3, Insightful)
Actually, this is exactly the process of recounting votes in the old pull the lever machines. They did not keep individual votes either. The recount was to make sure the process of tallying the votes "up stream" from the machines was correct; or really to check the math and communications of the humans doing the sums based on the reported numbers called into the election offices. The difference between then and now is that our parents trusted those machines, and we here on /. don't trust the electronic v
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Re:What!? (Score:1)
Of course, we could have had open-source voting machines made by a reputable company, but no...
Nice and ironic (Score:5, Funny)
who's your target audience (Score:1, Offtopic)
2/3 of Slashdot just had their eyes glaze over at the sight of weird computer speak.
The other 1/3 is still trying to figure out what the result of that function would be. Is it a function? What were the parameters again? Dammit.
Re:who's your target audience (Score:1)
(real time to recount) = (estimated time to recount) in base (court challanges)
Which means:
(estimated time to count).
(court challange).
(esitmated time to count).
(court challange).
.
.
.
so on until (court challanges) is reached.
Thus the base transfer is complete.
The result is (court challanges)*((time to count)+(time to challange))
There, was that confusing enough? I rewrote it twice.
(of course, if this is a simple division moduli, the result is anywhere between 0 and (court chal
Re:who's your target audience (Score:2)
Re:No Hand Counting of Electronic Votes (Score:4, Funny)
Does make sense though (Score:2)
They're just double-checking to see if the end total is correct.
Re:Does make sense though (Score:2)
Every recount must be done by 12/13 to matter (Score:2, Interesting)
They all meet on December 13th to discuss and submit sealed votes.
That's Monday...
Forget voting machines and numbers they generate (Score:1)
Discussions about paper trails, auditing and such are for future elections. Only votes (not necessarily ballots) which have an origin which can be proven should be accepted. All others should be discarded. Without being able to prove the provenance of the "votes" it cannot proven that there was no monkey business. That's a lot of what having an open and fair election is about - proving there was no mon
Re:Every recount must be done by 12/13 to matter (Score:3)
They all meet on December 13th to discuss and submit sealed votes.
But we're not talking about the Presidential election, not in this state at least. Washington state's gov race could go on for years, AFAIK.
Ohio, on the other hand, is another story entirely [votecobb.org]. And even if the electors pick Massa Dubya on Monday, the results must still be certified by Congress on January 6, 2005. If the Green/Libertarian recount push discover
Re:Every recount must be done by 12/13 to matter (Score:2)
If they actually were looking for a problem (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:If they actually were looking for a problem (Score:3, Interesting)
The problem with this particular case is that the margin of victory is absolutely tiny (42 out of about 2.8 milli
Re:If they actually were looking for a problem (Score:1)
It's not a sample we want. We're not after statistical estimate. All we want to do is confirm that it's fairly unlikely that any of the machines gave the wrong count.
We assume that anyone who wanted to rig the election by using faulty machines would rig more than one machine. If there are 100 machines, and 10 of them are rigged, then rigourously testing 10 of them, bu comparing the actual count w
Re:If they actually were looking for a problem (Score:1)
It's not a sample we want. We're not after statistical estimate.
Um, only testing some of the machines to draw conclusions about all of them is using a sample (10 machines out of however many there are) and the results would be a statistical estimate of the performance of the rest of the machines.
roughly a 70% chance of hitting a compromised machine. Enough to deter fraud for
Re:If they actually were looking for a problem (Score:1)
We don't want to be 100% confident that 99.9985% of the machines are working. We want to be reasonbly confident that 100% of the machines are working correctly. If one of them is out by a single vote, then the whole count is invalid and needs to be recounted in full. It's not like we're recording approximate values. A count of votes is an integer count of discrete values. 100% accuracy is a requirement.
If any one of the machines is faulty (i.e. gets t
Re:If they actually were looking for a problem (Score:1)
Perhaps if it is a problem of design then all of them will be faulty. If it is a problem of equipment failure it could easily be isolated to a single machine.
If one of them is out by a single vote, then the whole count is invalid and needs to be recounted in full.
Exactly my point. A system of sampling cannot exclude the po
Re:If they actually were looking for a problem (Score:1)
In which case, the closeness of the election has very little bearing. Even if the winner by 10% you'd need to check most of the machines to get that level of certainty.
But, there's NOTHING to recount! (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:But, there's NOTHING to recount! (Score:1)
Sorry. I hadn't read the article. Yup, it looks like they've been really stupid here. Still, it would make sense to print hard copies from at least one of the machines to be sure it actually gets its own count correct. It won't guarentee it has recorded the vote correctly, but some of these machines are so bad that it's worth checking it got the count right.
what a farce (Score:2)
Hrmm (Score:1)
Re:Hrmm (Score:2)
That's the way it should be! (Score:2)
having lived in Snohomish County (Score:1)
The Electronic voting machines, were terminals and each machine output a smart card and I turned in the smart card to the poll worker. You could take the record on the card and compare it to the record in the machine. But truly, then the issue becomes the integrity of the system, and I am a lot more concerned with Mail-in ballots and forgeries than i am with e-voting systems.
Re:having lived in Snohomish County (Score:1)
trust machines (Score:2)
Re:trust machines (Score:1)
Re:trust machines (Score:2)
score one for confusion (Score:2)
The only way we can secure it in theory (Score:2)
Have a national biometrics database connected to your SSN, name, etc.
Require every voter to submit to a comprehensive biometrics exam and tag their vote with the data. Second, anyone who accesses the system to have any interaction with the results whatsoever has to submit to a biometrics scan that gets their DNA, finger prints and retina scan as well as name and all that. Do not allow mass deletion of any data without at least five third parties and the press observing the action and recording it for publ