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Very interesting stuff. (Score:2, Insightful)
All that really matters after reading TFA:
Chaum says he hasn’t decided on a cost yet for jurisdictions who will license it after the initial adopter but says he can easily sell it for half the cost of current optical-scan voting systems, which run about $6,000 apiece.
Very good stuff. I would just avoid using the word "subversion" when talking about it. You know, because of its double meaning
Cost of printing? (Score:3, Interesting)
Maybe I'm missing something, but for this to be truly secure against the problem of being able to see who somebody else voted for, you would have to have a distinct set of three-digit codes for every ballot, or at least such a large number of distinct ballots that no person could practically conspire with a few other people to figure out that XWP in the third field means Hillary Clinton. Wouldn't printing each ballot individually result in a tremendous cost compared with traditional ballot printing? I'm just trying to understand how this could be feasible on a large scale....
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Each ballot has a unique ID number to start off with, so they have that system in place already.
They just need to add printing a unique cryptographic IDs with special ink to the process - might not even require a 3rd reprint
Re:Cost of printing? (Score:4, Informative)
The printing of ballots in most jurisdictions already falls under the category of "custom" printing. Ballots are unique every election (despite an enormous preponderance of re-elected incumbents). Ballots can vary from precinct to precinct to the extent that, in theory, no two precincts are alike, because of differing jurisdictions (different counties, different cities, different municipalities of various flavors). That combined with the relatively low number of copies made for any particular precinct means that the cost of printing each one uniquely isn't different. The printing won't be done by high-speed high-volume expensive-setup full-color color-separated presses anyway. It'll be done by laser printer or thermal printer or such.
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So how long... (Score:2)
Chaum's system is very cool (Score:5, Insightful)
It does what many people would have said is impossible: It allows voters to verify that their votes were cast and counted correctly, but does not provide them with any way to prove to anyone who they voted for. An audit trail, without opening the door to coercion. This is a major improvement over traditional voting technologies.
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but does not provide them with any way to prove to anyone who they voted for.
But can I check to make sure not just that my vote "was counted" but that my vote was for the right person?
Re:Chaum's system is very cool (Score:5, Informative)
"But voters can't be sure just by looking at their ballot image that the system interpreted the codes accurately to apply the vote to the correct candidate. That's where independent auditors come in."
TFA to the rescue.
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but does not provide them with any way to prove to anyone who they voted for.
But can I check to make sure not just that my vote "was counted" but that my vote was for the right person?
You can verify that your vote was received correctly. This still doesn't tell you that your vote winds up in the final tally. There's an important distinction there.
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Who the heck cares? My State already has this "check your vote online" deal, and I didn't even bother to look it up when I got home. I don't honestly believe that if my choice McCain had won, anything would be any better. So what's it matter whether my vote was counted or not.
I have this novel idea that we should follow the KISS principle. Take a piece of paper. Circle your guy. Toss it into a box. Count the ballots by hand. Keep. It. Simple.
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I have this novel idea that we should follow the KISS principle. Take a piece of paper. Circle your guy. Toss it into a box. Count the ballots by hand. Keep. It. Simple.
That's how my town does it - each volunteer counts 100-200 ballots. It's not a hard ratio to achieve in any way. On average, each citizen would only have to volunteer once per hundred elections, not bad.
It is, however, second best. There's no stopping an organized gang from switching out the ballot box like Chaum's system does.
Still, on a
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Arrows Theorem.
thanks for the pointer. If the Wikipedia article is correct, the big problem seems to be his requirement that any sub-set of elections should turn out the same as the whole election if considered separately. I'm not sure that's a sensible expectation in a real election.
first the machines, then the system (Score:3, Insightful)
Hear hear!
I believe FPTP is killing our political system by making it a constantly devolving lesser-of-two-evils non-choice.
Getting a well-working computerized voting system is a first step to implementing something more sensible than First Past The Post.
Re:Chaum's system is very cool (Score:5, Informative)
but does not provide them with any way to prove to anyone who they voted for.
But can I check to make sure not just that my vote "was counted" but that my vote was for the right person?
Yes:
Voters make their selections on a paper ballot using special pens with ink designed by Chaum. When a voter fills in an oval on the ballot, the ink in the pen, which is similar to the yellow ink in highlighter pens, reacts with invisible ink in the oval and turns most of the oval black. At the same time, a unique three-letter code pre-printed on the ballot inside each oval is revealed to the voter.
After making their choices, voters use a form to write down the serial number that is printed on their ballot as well as the three-digit codes inside the ovals they’ve chosen. The codes are generated cryptographically and are different on every ballot to prevent someone from deciphering the voter’s choices and engaging in vote-buying.
So that's the "verify that it was recorded correctly" part. For the "verify it went to the right candidate part":
Voters can also see, based on the three-letter codes, that the system seems to have recorded their selections accurately. But voters can’t be sure just by looking at their ballot image that the system interpreted the codes accurately to apply the vote to the correct candidate. That’s where independent auditors come in.
Scantegrity uses a process called “zero knowledge” that allows skilled, independent auditors to verify that the codes result in votes going to the right candidates, without actually revealing an individual voter’s selections.
I don't know how it works exactly, but I assume it's similar to a public/private keypair given that they describe it as a cryptographic mechanism. The interesting thing is that anyone can audit the election results to demonstrate that votes were counted accurately: https://scantegrity.org/svn/data/takoma-nov3-2009/PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ [scantegrity.org]
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How exactly do we verify that the choices we didn't pick on the form don't have the same set of verification characters as the candidate we did choose?
That's handled by pre-election auditing. There's more information on how at http://scantegrity.org./ [scantegrity.org.]
Or, go straight to the research paper at http://www.scantegrity.org/papers/ScantegrityII-EVT.pdf [scantegrity.org]
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But the practical implementation could provide a way to prove that they voted for someone. My cynical suspicion is that by the second or third election, they'll use mass-produced ballots ballots that only have three or four different sets of codes on them to reduce the cost of ballot printing. And no one will be the wiser except for the people exploiting it. Where this system fails is in proving that the codes are truly unique. The only way you can guarantee that is if instead of using fixed printed cod
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No, apparently it's only "skilled auditors" who can verify things. And voters can prove who they voted for to anyone who has access to the ballots post election.
I think I know what the 3 letter code is... (Score:2, Funny)
Let's hope that this new system prevents premature revelation of election results... [youtube.com]
What's a digit? (Score:2)
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Specimens need not be perfect renditions is my guess.
Question? (Score:2)
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The objection to receipts is that receipts that show voting choices can be used for Vote buying.
If we stick to codes, vote buying is not so easy.
You'd need a crib sheet as well.
But all you know is that your vote entered this machine, not that it was tallied by Deep Thought at election central.
Transparency fail. (Score:2)
Transparency fail.
Web Logs? (Score:4, Insightful)
Quoting TFA
"When polls close, voters can go to the election office website, type in their ballot serial number and see a rendition of a ballot, showing the three-digit codes for their votes. This way voters can be assured that their ballot was included in the final tally."
One would hope there are no web logs kept, because simply checking your ballot would reveal your identity, and someone is sure to wrangle a subpoena for that.
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One would hope there are no web logs kept, because simply checking your ballot would reveal your identity, and someone is sure to wrangle a subpoena for that.
Reveal your identity and.... what? The ballot you check on-line just has some random letters on it that should match what you wrote down in the voting booth. It says nothing about who you voted for. So if someone identifies you from the web log, all they've verified is that (a) you voted and (b) you verified your ballot.
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But the whole system wouldn't work at all if there was not a linkage between your three letters and the Candidate's name SOMEWHERE.
Incorrect. Those letters have nothing to do with your vote selection, they're just an integrity check.
Again, read the paper [scantegrity.org].
Re:Web Logs? (Score:4, Interesting)
Even simpler. Have the system display ranges of ballot numbers and codes, not just single ones. If I have serial number 12345 and I click on a link to examine papers 12300-12399, the eavesdropper doesn't know which of the 100 ballots displayed I checked.
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Great on paper - but in real life? (Score:5, Insightful)
This system assumes three things:
Re:Great on paper - but in real life? (Score:5, Insightful)
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Re:Great on paper - but in real life? (Score:5, Insightful)
This system assumes three things:
Per TFA, only about 5% of participants have to validate their vote afterward to assure the election's integrity to within normal margins. Also, exit polls in the Maryland town showed that about 30% of voters copied down their validation info. If a third of them bother to go online to check their ballots, that will be double the required participation.
Everyone is perfect - people who incorrectly cast their vote will always suspect fraud, calling the entire election into question.
Individuals will always have suspicions, but unless there is a widespread pattern of "errors", rational voters will be able to have greater confidence than they do in any other system. Unlike any other system, this one actually provide a way where lost or altered ballots have a chance of being discovered.
Everyone is sane - individual voters do not lie about about their vote to game the system, cast doubt on the election, etc.
Again, isolated cases will occur, but that happens regardless. In the absence of significant numbers of reports from generally honest and reliable people, then we'll have more confidence in the accuracy of the vote than any other system can provide.
Basically, your objections boil down to "Nothing is perfect". Well, duh. But it doesn't have to be perfect, it just has to be better. And it is.
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What are the options? (Score:3, Interesting)
Election workers keep eyes open. At the end of the day reps of all the people involved stand around in a open room and count.
Takes time, expensive, but hard to fake.
If you cannot make it, postal or an election worker comes to you.
As for digital, open source, simple and all parties can see the unit, code.
On the day you press and its collected at a central point.
Instant and the press love it.
The problem with the above is no room for profit or stuffing.
Your part of the world has to have been so corrupt, at war or new to democracy to get it working.
In the US you are told its so open free and fair and transparent every day.
Is it? Why are AMT sellers making the closed source units? With cable pundits and talking heads screaming at you "they are used in banks, its fine", dont mind the party political rants by the owner.
Enigma, cryptoAG ect all gave perfect service on the day.
In Capitalist West a nice man owns the IP to your vote.
In Soviet Russia a nice gov owns the IP to your vote.
In both parts of the world, you have a right to vote.
As Stalin said "It's not the people who vote that count. It's the people who count the votes."
The end count is the elephant in the room, not just the cute open source, optical-scan $x,000 input device.
It's Takoma Park, folks (Score:3, Interesting)
This is the place they like to call the "Berkeley of the East". It's so liberal it's almost a parody. I think the MD Democratic Party keeps it around as a pure strain in a petri dish so that they can pretend they are also liberal.
It also means that if Takoma Park thinks it's a good idea, everyone else in MD will think it's a joke and ignore it.
Is voter verification really desirable? (Score:3, Interesting)
I have real doubts about allowing voters to check how they voted AFTER they leave the polling place. By allowing a voter a way to verify how he voted you open the door to all sorts of abuses. A voter could sell his vote and the buyer could have a way to check he indeed did vote the way the buyer wanted. Another abuse is employers threatening his employees with firing if he did not vote the way the employer wanted.
The problems might be overcome if the voter would have to visit the election clerks office and prove his identity and was also alone when he viewed the way he voted.
This allows vote buying! (Score:3, Informative)
I don't see a single thing in this system that would prevent vote buying. You get a receipt with your choices on it, encoded in some form, yes? You can then go to a website, and enter codes, to see who you voted for, yes? True, only the individual voter (or someone possessing the receipt) can do this.. but that doesn't matter a damn to a vote buyer. Why? Because, as this system's designers seem to have forgotten, the voter is complicit in vote buying. The voter gets money for turning over his receipt and secret knowledge, whatever that may be, to the person who wants a verified vote for his candidate.
Re:This allows vote buying! (Score:4, Informative)
The website only shows you: serial number 1234567 voted for these codes: two-letters two-letters two-letters, etc.
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It completely misses the point (Score:3, Interesting)
It completely misses the point. The point is not that a system is "impossible" to manipulate. The point is that _every_ voter has the ability to check the vote.
Just compare it with the pen and paper based system. Everybody can understand it. You have a box which must be empty when they start voting. And people come in, get a piece of paper each, fill it out in private fold it and throw it into the box. At the same time his name gets crossed out on a list. Now everybody can check this fairly easily.
Now let's look at whatever machine-based system you've got. You've got this machine, either mechanical or electronical. You usually cannot look inside of it. You cannot tell if the levers are labelled correctly or if the firmware is really what it's supposed to be. Even if you have sourcecode that's completely unusable for the 90% of people who cannot read code. Relying on others is not an option as the others could be against you. Just imagine a party forming beeing against computers, which programmer would help them?
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I know the Florida ballot count debacle wasn't all that long ago, but are we that concerned about votes not being counted?
If we were concerned about people's votes not being counted would we be testing a Cryptic New Voting System? ... Oops sorry, Freudian misread.
Re:Interesting, but... (Score:5, Insightful)
but are we that concerned about votes not being counted?
I was about to write a long reply about how democracy depends on the fact that bla bla bla... and how you cannot trust people, especially what in politics and bla bla bla... but you asked a simple question so I'll give you a simple answer:
Yes.
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The Real question... (Score:5, Insightful)
Ok, so this system proves that your vote reached the tally server, but how does it prove that your vote is actually in the total?
I'm serious. Just because your vote wasn't lost, doesn't mean it was counted. This helps guard against grievous mistakes, not against wholesale fraud.
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Ok, so this system proves that your vote reached the tally server, but how does it prove that your vote is actually in the total?
I'm serious. Just because your vote wasn't lost, doesn't mean it was counted. This helps guard against grievous mistakes, not against wholesale fraud.
I'm confused, are you replying to me? I only answered his question if we are concerned about votes not being counted. I never said nor did I imply that this was the right or the wrong way to do it.
But to answer your question, the only way to make sure of this is if the software that is in use is completely open source. That way anybody who's interested may view the source and follow the the procedure, from submission to results.
Re:The Real question... (Score:4, Informative)
Good question. They use "zero knowledge" proofs: [wikipedia.org]
"Scantegrity uses a process called “zero knowledge” that allows skilled, independent auditors to verify that the codes result in votes going to the right candidates, without actually revealing an individual voter’s selections."
It's super-cool stuff every slashdot geek needs to know. So, this allows us to insure our vote was counted without enabling us to sell our votes. Very cool! However, it still not fool-proof. A friend of a friend of mine has gotten so worked up over an election that she went to the polls early, and often, and voted for her whole extended family. Without requiring photo-IDs, it's really easy to do. Every show up to a poll and see your name has already been crossed off?
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but are we that concerned about votes not being counted?
I was about to write a long reply about how democracy depends on the fact that bla bla bla... and how you cannot trust people, especially what in politics and bla bla bla... but you asked a simple question so I'll give you a simple answer: Yes.
To most people it's only "Yes" if the election doesn't go their way.
Re:Interesting, but... (Score:4, Informative)
I'm far more concerned about phantom votes being counted than real votes not being counted.
Both are real issues. There are plenty of examples of ballot boxes getting "lost", so those are real problems. Dead people voting, multiple votes, systematic exclusion of voters (not losing their ballots, but preventing them from voting), all of these things are problems.
This system doesn't solve all of those other problems, but it does solve the problem of votes getting lost, altered or counted incorrectly. And it does it in a mathematically-provable fashion.
See the paper [scantegrity.org].
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Re:Interesting, but... (Score:4, Informative)
Not sure I'm reading you properly, but this system allows you to verify your vote was COUNTED, nothing more. You can't show or prove to anyone HOW you voted, just that you did and that your vote is in the tally AS CAST.
This is huge. I've been waiting for chaum's election stuff to actually be used for quite some time now. I'm hugely excited.
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Re:Interesting, but... (Score:5, Informative)
Not sure I'm reading you properly, but this system allows you to verify your vote was COUNTED, nothing more. You can't show or prove to anyone HOW you voted, just that you did and that your vote is in the tally AS CAST.
Er, unless I'm missing something, it's still possible to prove to someone how you voted. You just need to take a picture of your ballot, showing that the code "JX" is in the bubble next to "John Smith" -- this is pretty easy if you're voting absentee, or if you aren't frisked and metal-detected on your way into the voting booth. When the local thug comes around to verify your vote, you show him the picture and your ballot ID, and then he goes online to make sure that your ballot ID and your "JX" vote are in the system.
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Re:Interesting, but... (Score:5, Informative)
But it doesn't scale, imho. Everybody voting absentee in a district? Red flag.
In the state where I live, 37 of the 39 counties have nothing but absentee voting. You can go to the election office to drop off your ballot, but everyone gets a ballot weeks in advance.
On the other hand, that means we've already conceded the battle against this sort of voter intimidation/bribery. The thug can just watch you fill out the ballot. Hasn't been a problem in practice, though... yet.
Digital camera in the booth too often? (Some people are savvy enough to turn off the sounds, and some people are savvy enough to hide their camera. But most people are not.) Red flag. Game over.
I don't know about your camera, but mine is cleverly hidden inside my cell phone. Doesn't take much savvy to get one of those, and before long, almost everyone will have a 3+ megapixel camera in their pocket -- if we're not there already.
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Countries where voter intimidation is a significant problem are normally so screwed that you'd be glad you're actually getting paid to vote however they want, rather than them just announcing the results (before the elections even