SiggyRadiation writes "According to their newsletter (my English translation here), the Dutch group that 'doesn't trust the voting computers' has won a round against the industry and the civil servants that seem hell-bent on reintroducing voting machines — NewVote, made by SDU — that the Dutch minister of the interior has suspended. Apparently SDU provided 5 slightly different samples of its machine to the Dutch version of the NSA (well... the very humble Dutch version anyway) for testing purposes. Of those five, four machines emitted radiation in such a way that the votes cast could be monitored. SDU's NewVote received its final deathblow when it became clear that the one machine that stayed within the radiation limits used a green-on-red color-scheme for its screen. And that would be a small problem for the 4% of all men that cannot distinguish between red and green."
My first thought was to wonder why the Dutch were the only ones freaking out over a vulnerability that probably affects every electronic voting machine on the planet. But of course, Van Eck is a local security bigshot and if he wasn't on the commission himself, his buddies probably were.
The old Nedap voting machines use obsolete hardware, and those machines are often not stored in a secure way (so they could be tampered with).
The new machines run Windows and a wireless modem. That doesn't sound like a safe combination to me.
As far as I'm concerned, a voting machine should at least make an immediate print-out of each vote (a good old-fashioned line printer would do), so that a recount can be done to check the machine's results.
In fact, during the general assembly elections of november 2006 a lot of counties decided to revert to old-skool paper and pencil voting because of the same issues. Wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl [wijvertrou...ersniet.nl] has done some excellent work!
a lot of counties decided to revert to old-skool paper and pencil voting because of the same issues
Unfortunately, pencil and paper voting was rejected. Of the 5 prototype pencils tested, 4 contained lead and the one lead-free pencil was determined to lose it sharpness after several votes.
Yes, this is a blow, but in the end, electronic voting will overcome the shortcomings and the missteps and become they way to cast one's ballot. While there are presently insecurites and faults in the machines those will eventually be minimized so that they become more reliable and less fallible than traditional voting methods (which of course are less than infallible --but many don't want to acknowlewdge that.)
Except there's a big difference between forging paper ballots, or having people vote multiple times under different identities, and using a computer-based system which could be altered easily enough to not record votes at all, record the incorrect votes, or have its count altered by an outside agent. Even the idea of a paper trail is somewhat laughable, as you're expecting people to hang on to this piece of paper for a significant time, on the off chance it might be needed to verify how they voted.
Computer-based voting is a long way from being a reliable enough method to be used exclusively. I think for now there should be a concentration on creating ballots that are easily machine-readible, making the counting easier. Purely computer-driven systems will have to be phased in in small numbers, so they can be monitored and bugs ironed out. Perhaps give people a choice of what type of machine they wish to use. You're going to have to do a lot of work to convince me that this technology is robust enough and secure enough to be used exclusively.
The methods of fraud might be different, but the real question is what is the impact on the election(s) overall? Which method produces a more accurate count? When electronic voting proves more reliable it should be adopted as such.
The banking system is based on computers (and thedre aren't many examples of exploiting the system --sure there is oversight by the account-bearer but the point is the errors are small overall). The major kinks in the electronic banking system have been worked out; they shal
Electronic voting steals you half of your voting rights: The right to watch the counting. As someone born and raised in the former Eastern Block I know this is important. We had the right to mark a sheet of paper with a pen and put it in a box. But the outcome was predetermined anyway. Most later convictions for voting fraud in East Germany were only possible, because people watched the counting in enough voting places in 1989 to compare their results with the officially stated.
So don't let you take the right to watch the counting!
No, no, no! That's not how voter-verifiable paper trails work! If you let the voter keep the piece of paper, they can use it to show how they voted (to collect a payment for their vote, or avoid being beat up or fired). If the piece of paper can't be visually read by the voter for them to know what it says, it isn't "voter-verifiable" any longer and doesn't allow immediate detection of fraud. Nobody wants to let the voter keep a piece of paper. (Well, almost nobody. There are some proposals where the paper is only readable using separate equipment which the voter is only allowed to access when alone, but that's a corner case and has problems of its own).
Instead, VVPT systems have a traditional physical lockbox. Think of the paper as being something behind glass; the user looks at it, validates that it says what they want it to say, and then press "yes" or "no". Press yes? It's deposited in a lockbox which can be secured via traditional methods. Press no? It's marked as void, or shredded, or whatever. It's not the voter's responsibility or burden to track the paper; rather, it's kept in the voting system for use in audits and recounts. (Audits being a very important thing -- having the ability to audit means you can take a sample of the physical ballots, check whether the proportions match what the electronic counters said, and know whether you have a big enough problem to require a larger recount).
This is still an improvement over pure paper ballots because you have the usability and accessibility enhancements associated with electronic voting, but the enhanced auditability associated with a piece of paper which a voter has looked at and approved.
Think of the paper as being something behind glass; the user looks at it, validates that it says what they want it to say, and then press "yes" or "no". Press yes? It's deposited in a lockbox which can be secured via traditional methods.
And if someone can reprogram the machine to record votes a certain way, why can't they program it to dispense the correct paper audits as well? And a lock-box? Secure? You're right back to the same problem you have with paper ballots. Locks can be picked, boxes lost... so you end up with all the safeguards you have now plus those required to secure the computers and electronics from tampering. The only way you could be sure that the paper audit would work is the voter retained it, thereby confirming that
And if someone can reprogram the machine to record votes a certain way, why can't they program it to dispense the correct paper audits as well?
That's why they're behind glass where the voter can look at the paper before confirming his or her vote. If I told the machine I'm voting for Bob but the piece of paper behind the glass window says Alice, I (the voter) know there's something wrong.
And a lock-box? Secure? You're right back to the same problem you have with paper ballots.
With e-voting, you don't need to corrupt the officials -- you can corrupt the technicians, over whom the officials have no effective oversight. Even worse, some systems are so ineffectively built that they can be subverted by an individual without any inside access -- see the photos of unattended machines from the last elections, documentation on attacks that would work against them, etc. Further, there are effective countermeasures for ballot box stuffing. There are judges from both major parties at any pol
Nobody wants to let the voter keep a piece of paper.
And I'll tell you why:
Voting machines with printers cost more.
The printers will jam; which will take the voting machine that it's attached to out of service until someone can fix it. If the machine is in a busy precinct, this may not happen immediately (assuming, of course, that someone *can* fix it - these people are volunteers, remember? They aren't selected for their technical skills). This problem becomes worse if the printer is integrated into the
So what... I don't think anyone out there but a few neophytes truly object to computer assisted voting. BUT it needs to be done right, and potentially needs to always be optional.
"and become they way to cast one's ballot." Of course they will eventually become the way to cast ones ballot; it's become obvious that certain interests want electronic voting systems and are going to implement them, no matter what.
"which of course are less than infallible"
Certainly, traditional voting methods are fallible, but tell me this: can you devise a paper based system wherein less than a dozen people need to be involved to tailor the result of a particular election to their wishes? That would be tr
Congratulations! It took just a little over half an hour for Microsoft to get mentioned in a subject that has completely zero to do with them... God how I love Slashdot! Now if someone would just mention Nazis...
One of the many good points Rob made during his talk at last year's 23C3 [events.ccc.de] in Berlin was to call the things voting computers as opposed to voting machines. Machine is associated with a simple, understandable and verifiable piece of gear, while computers are very complex, difficult to understand even by experts and unverifiable. Although the commonly used term (in Dutch) was machines, too, they exclusively referred to computers, and within a fairly short period of time everybody called them that way. In a way this was their first major success. Funnily enough, when they - much later - got hold of an actual device, the label on the back said voting computer, too: that's what the manufacturer had called them all along, internally, that is.
But a voting computer is one that computes votes (not so much a computer that has a right to vote and then so votes). So, it's a bit of an ambiguous term.
You mean to be funny, but it's true. It would take a very naive engineer (or cheapskape company) to forget to properly shield a computer. Since the emissions can be meaningful to someone with the proper test set, more shielding than normal is required if the vote is to remain secret.
"NewVote received its final deathblow when it became clear that the one machine that stayed within the radiation limits used a green-on-red color-scheme for its screen. And that would be a small problem for the 4% of all men that cannot distinguish between red and green."
Good heavens. As a a person with good old-fashioned red/green colourblindness I assure you that this statement is false.
There is no way that 4% of men can't distinguish between red and green. There's some difficulty in some circumstances, but a green on red colour screen on a voting machine would almost certainly be readable. They'll use high-contrast hues.
The vast majority of red-green colourblindness results from a cone deficiency. In some circumstances it's difficult to make out some differences, but if I see a red shirt, I know it's red and not green. Green lettering on the red shirt would likely be completely readable.
However, I seldom see purple. Usually it looks blue to me.
Just a verification of the parent. I'm also red/green colorblind and while I can't see this [steverosswick.com] I can tell the difference between red and green. It's colors that are only separated by shades of red or green that are a problem. Think white to pink or blue to purple.
You are aware that your condition is not a uniform one correct? I am unsure from your post if you are claiming that because YOU could see it just fine that the statement is incorrect or something else. In any case I can also add a completely irrelevant anecdote to the story: my father in law cannot see red from green in MOST cases. My point is that unless you have some sort of evidence that the statistics mentioned in the article are incorrect then your statement is just as bad if not worse than theirs.
You are aware that your condition is not a uniform one correct? I am unsure from your post if you are claiming that because YOU could see it just fine that the statement is incorrect or something else. In any case I can also add a completely irrelevant anecdote to the story: my father in law cannot see red from green in MOST cases. My point is that unless you have some sort of evidence that the statistics mentioned in the article are incorrect then your statement is just as bad if not worse than theirs. Wor
Having red-green colorblindness, I can say that your typical high-contrast hues (bright red and normal or dark green) can be extremely hard to tell apart. I've missed stop signs while staring right where the sign should be because of the dark green foliage behind it and I have to get up real close to red-on-black signs to be able to read them (maybe 1/3rd the distance that I need for more legible white-on-black or black-on-white signs). PS: I prefer to call it red colorblindness, as I have no trouble seeing
As a a person with good old-fashioned red/green colourblindness [...] if I see a red shirt, I know it's red and not green. Green lettering on the red shirt would likely be completely readable.
However, I seldom see purple. Usually it looks blue to me.
Or, you know, it could just be made to use BLACK AND WHITE, because that pair is the highest contrast you can achieve, and everyone who can read text.. can read it(By "Can read text", I mean in the present tense, if they know how to read but their eyes have been removed, they can no longer read.;) )
Or, you know, it could just be made to use BLACK AND WHITE
I suspect it's not as easy as that: the reason it's not possible to eavesdrop using the radiation is most likely that the whole screen has a similar luminance value, and it's hard to distinguish (from the radiated signal) bright green from bright red. If you change to black&white, it's easier for everyone to read, including the guy next door with his eavesdropping device:-)
The "Wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet" protesters has been manouevred into a corner by the industry and the state. The group's principal argument has always been this:
"Voting machines (without a paper trail) make it impossible to verify the fairness of an election"
In addition, they have gone to show how election results could be manipulated, and how cast votes could be read from outside the polling station. The protesters have had a lot of success getting a number of machines removed from the elections, and they have certainly managed to put the issue onto the political agenda and the public debates. However, with all this media coverage, they are failing to state, re-state and re-re-state their principle argument: that there is a fundamental problem with using voting machines. I have never heard one of their spokespersons state that fixing these small problems with the computers is not enough, and is basically a side-issue. The machine's proponents have taken this opportunity to turn the fundamental problem into a side-issue.
The press, politicians (who want to use voting machines) and the voting machine manufacturers jumped on the issue, stating: "You are right, there's an issue with certain machines but we'll get it fixed". When the machines get fixed, the protest group's role will have been played out. Any subsequent complaints about the fundamental issues with voting machines will be dismissed by the public as whining from a group who are just looking for any excuse to go on protesting.
...computers save time and money. In theory, the vote counts can be available the instant the polls close, and we need to hire fewer people to administer an election. Furthermore, it saves time for the voter. You walk in, tap a touchscreen a few times, and you're done. There are many more reasons, but in essence it's time and money.
Ahhh.. only in a capital-obsessed culture is this even a meaningful reason, much less a valid one.
I, for one, am willing to pay more if it means ensuring the integrity of my co
It's nice to see that someone cares about the secrecy of the voting process, but I would think that integrity in the vote count itself would take a much higher priority over this issue.
In some remote way, it reminds me of the military's concern long ago (and largely before my time) over the use of IBM Selectric typewriters, as the RF emissions (i.e. coils and motors starting and stopping, a primitive spark-gap transmitter in a sense) from the mechanisms could be detected and reconstituted into what was b
If someone can tell who you voted for, your vote is completely worthless and should not be counted at all.
A union leader or employer could demand that you vote for a certain candidate and verify that you obeyed. Someone could offer you money to vote one way or another, paying up after the vote has been verified--and people complain about votes being "bought and sold" now. A person may indicate one way on an open petition to avoid being ostracized, but can vote his true feelings on a secret ballot. This
"If someone can tell who you voted for, your vote is completely worthless and should not be counted at all."
So when the votes are tallied, if they can figure out who you voted for, it isn't counted. Isn't that kind of the opposite of the situation in Florida and Ohio in the last elections? Do you only count those votes that you can't determine who they voted for?? Which candidate gets the indeterminate votes?? This sounds like a brilliant system - I'm sure Katherine Harris would support it...
a few years ago this was a big deal and everyone was worried that the government was going to use radiation emitted by CRT monitors to reconstruct what was on the screen, people even made special fonts that minimized this by blurring and breaking up the edges of glyphs.
then LCD's became cheap enough for just about anyone to buy.
then LCD's became cheap enough for just about anyone to buy.
so?
Van Eck phreaking is the process of eavesdropping on the contents of a CRT or LCD display by detecting its electromagnetic emissions. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Van_Eck_phreaking [wikipedia.org])
I love technology as much as the next guy, but what's wrong with paper voting? Canada uses it, it scales nicely, there's a perfect record of who voted for what, with a nice X right there. You can track ballots in, and ballots out. Nobody knows who put the X on the paper.
Pushy sales jobs make me nervous, and these things are being hawked like a $500 used car.
It's not the paper voting that's the problem, it's the paper counting. In the last election (for senate) there were IIRC 9 different measures on my ballot. Sometimes there are only a couple like in a primary, other times there could be a dozen or more. Also, some are yes/no and some are multiple choice + write in. Keeping a count of all these without some form of help is pretty annoying. I guess you could have stations, where each one counts only a particular ballot measure. That would probably be the m
We want them gone because their integrity and reliability are in question, not whether they meet the "ADA" (or equivalent in other countries) requirements or that voter privacy might be violated.
In fact, having a machine that specifically reads voter responses for the purpose of comparing them with the machine's reported voting results might be an EXCELLENT thing. If the tally's don't match, we'd know something was afoot.
A Dutch citizen group "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet" ("We do not trust voting machines"), released a report performing a secuirty review of the the Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting systems. Chapter 6 (page 14) covers "Compromising emanations" (i.e. TEMPEST). The Nedap machines are DRE systems, but are not a traditional touchscreen. They use an electromechanical touch sensitive full-face ballot interface (similar to the Shouptronic). However, the TEMPEST issues were not related to the input features, but r
Why don't we make a reality TV show out of the election?
Think about it. You get the candidates on TV, mebbe have them compete somehow. Have some experts in politics and government ask them questions that the candidates must answer. We can even have them tour the country making public appearances to try and gather support!
And here's the best part: The people actually get to vote for who gets to be President! Just send a text message to 1-800-VOTEUSA and choose your favorite candidate!
I assume it it because of the radiation regulation. I'm just pulling this out of my arse but it is well possible that this combination minimises the ability of "van eck phreaking" to be successful.
Radiation? (Score:5, Funny)
Observer: "Looks like somebody voted for Dammechien Peteersrotmensenpoepjespiestnaaktgeborenzeldenthu
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I sometimes miss the rough Dutch humour...
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Well, not much of a phrase
(but consists of actual family names like naaktgebored (borne naked) and zeldenthus (seldom at home) )
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The old Nedap voting machines use obsolete hardware, and those machines are often not stored in a secure way (so they could be tampered with).
The new machines run Windows and a wireless modem. That doesn't sound like a safe combination to me.
As far as I'm concerned, a voting machine should at least make an immediate print-out of each vote (a good old-fashioned line printer would do), so that a recount can be done to check the machine's results.
Not the first time (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Not the first time (Score:5, Funny)
Unfortunately, pencil and paper voting was rejected. Of the 5 prototype pencils tested, 4 contained lead and the one lead-free pencil was determined to lose it sharpness after several votes.
Parent
In fits and starts but it will proceeed... (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:In fits and starts but it will proceeed... (Score:5, Insightful)
Except there's a big difference between forging paper ballots, or having people vote multiple times under different identities, and using a computer-based system which could be altered easily enough to not record votes at all, record the incorrect votes, or have its count altered by an outside agent. Even the idea of a paper trail is somewhat laughable, as you're expecting people to hang on to this piece of paper for a significant time, on the off chance it might be needed to verify how they voted.
Computer-based voting is a long way from being a reliable enough method to be used exclusively. I think for now there should be a concentration on creating ballots that are easily machine-readible, making the counting easier. Purely computer-driven systems will have to be phased in in small numbers, so they can be monitored and bugs ironed out. Perhaps give people a choice of what type of machine they wish to use. You're going to have to do a lot of work to convince me that this technology is robust enough and secure enough to be used exclusively.
Parent
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The methods of fraud might be different, but the real question is what is the impact on the election(s) overall? Which method produces a more accurate count? When electronic voting proves more reliable it should be adopted as such.
The banking system is based on computers (and thedre aren't many examples of exploiting the system --sure there is oversight by the account-bearer but the point is the errors are small overall). The major kinks in the electronic banking system have been worked out; they shal
Re:In fits and starts but it will proceeed... (Score:5, Interesting)
So don't let you take the right to watch the counting!
Parent
Re:In fits and starts but it will proceeed... (Score:5, Informative)
Instead, VVPT systems have a traditional physical lockbox. Think of the paper as being something behind glass; the user looks at it, validates that it says what they want it to say, and then press "yes" or "no". Press yes? It's deposited in a lockbox which can be secured via traditional methods. Press no? It's marked as void, or shredded, or whatever. It's not the voter's responsibility or burden to track the paper; rather, it's kept in the voting system for use in audits and recounts. (Audits being a very important thing -- having the ability to audit means you can take a sample of the physical ballots, check whether the proportions match what the electronic counters said, and know whether you have a big enough problem to require a larger recount).
This is still an improvement over pure paper ballots because you have the usability and accessibility enhancements associated with electronic voting, but the enhanced auditability associated with a piece of paper which a voter has looked at and approved.
Parent
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Think of the paper as being something behind glass; the user looks at it, validates that it says what they want it to say, and then press "yes" or "no". Press yes? It's deposited in a lockbox which can be secured via traditional methods.
And if someone can reprogram the machine to record votes a certain way, why can't they program it to dispense the correct paper audits as well? And a lock-box? Secure? You're right back to the same problem you have with paper ballots. Locks can be picked, boxes lost... so you end up with all the safeguards you have now plus those required to secure the computers and electronics from tampering. The only way you could be sure that the paper audit would work is the voter retained it, thereby confirming that
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That's why they're behind glass where the voter can look at the paper before confirming his or her vote. If I told the machine I'm voting for Bob but the piece of paper behind the glass window says Alice, I (the voter) know there's something wrong.
Those problems aren't too bad;
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Right, because no one ever stuffed a ballot box.
Personally I'd like to see it done on the damned web, with mandatory voting.
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Further, there are effective countermeasures for ballot box stuffing. There are judges from both major parties at any pol
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And I'll tell you why:
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Of course they will eventually become the way to cast ones ballot; it's become obvious that certain interests want electronic voting systems and are going to implement them, no matter what.
"which of course are less than infallible"
Certainly, traditional voting methods are fallible, but tell me this: can you devise a paper based system wherein less than a dozen people need to be involved to tailor the result of a particular election to their wishes? That would be tr
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Voting computers, not machines (Score:5, Interesting)
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Radiation???? (Score:4, Funny)
Some tin foil would solve that problem.
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crimes against UI (Score:3, Funny)
On democracy (Score:3, Funny)
Colourblind (Score:5, Informative)
Good heavens. As a a person with good old-fashioned red/green colourblindness I assure you that this statement is false.
There is no way that 4% of men can't distinguish between red and green. There's some difficulty in some circumstances, but a green on red colour screen on a voting machine would almost certainly be readable. They'll use high-contrast hues.
The vast majority of red-green colourblindness results from a cone deficiency. In some circumstances it's difficult to make out some differences, but if I see a red shirt, I know it's red and not green. Green lettering on the red shirt would likely be completely readable.
However, I seldom see purple. Usually it looks blue to me.
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PS: I prefer to call it red colorblindness, as I have no trouble seeing
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However, I seldom see purple. Usually it looks blue to me.
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Wrong, voting machines are winning the battle. (Score:4, Insightful)
"Voting machines (without a paper trail) make it impossible to verify the fairness of an election"
In addition, they have gone to show how election results could be manipulated, and how cast votes could be read from outside the polling station. The protesters have had a lot of success getting a number of machines removed from the elections, and they have certainly managed to put the issue onto the political agenda and the public debates. However, with all this media coverage, they are failing to state, re-state and re-re-state their principle argument: that there is a fundamental problem with using voting machines. I have never heard one of their spokespersons state that fixing these small problems with the computers is not enough, and is basically a side-issue. The machine's proponents have taken this opportunity to turn the fundamental problem into a side-issue.
The press, politicians (who want to use voting machines) and the voting machine manufacturers jumped on the issue, stating: "You are right, there's an issue with certain machines but we'll get it fixed". When the machines get fixed, the protest group's role will have been played out. Any subsequent complaints about the fundamental issues with voting machines will be dismissed by the public as whining from a group who are just looking for any excuse to go on protesting.
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Ahhh.. only in a capital-obsessed culture is this even a meaningful reason, much less a valid one.
I, for one, am willing to pay more if it means ensuring the integrity of my co
But what if someone just looked over your shoulder (Score:2, Insightful)
It's nice to see that someone cares about the secrecy of the voting process, but I would think that integrity in the vote count itself would take a much higher priority over this issue.
In some remote way, it reminds me of the military's concern long ago (and largely before my time) over the use of IBM Selectric typewriters, as the RF emissions (i.e. coils and motors starting and stopping, a primitive spark-gap transmitter in a sense) from the mechanisms could be detected and reconstituted into what was b
Secrecy and Integrity (Score:2)
A union leader or employer could demand that you vote for a certain candidate and verify that you obeyed. Someone could offer you money to vote one way or another, paying up after the vote has been verified--and people complain about votes being "bought and sold" now. A person may indicate one way on an open petition to avoid being ostracized, but can vote his true feelings on a secret ballot. This
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So when the votes are tallied, if they can figure out who you voted for, it isn't counted. Isn't that kind of the opposite of the situation in Florida and Ohio in the last elections? Do you only count those votes that you can't determine who they voted for?? Which candidate gets the indeterminate votes?? This sounds like a brilliant system - I'm sure Katherine Harris would support it...
TEMPEST (Score:3, Insightful)
a few years ago this was a big deal and everyone was worried that the government was going to use radiation emitted by CRT monitors to reconstruct what was on the screen, people even made special fonts that minimized this by blurring and breaking up the edges of glyphs.
then LCD's became cheap enough for just about anyone to buy.
i wonder if these machines use a CRT monitor
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so?
Van Eck phreaking is the process of eavesdropping on the contents of a CRT or LCD display by detecting its electromagnetic emissions. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Van_Eck_phreaking [wikipedia.org])
What's wrong with paper anyay? (Score:3, Insightful)
Pushy sales jobs make me nervous, and these things are being hawked like a $500 used car.
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Keeping a count of all these without some form of help is pretty annoying. I guess you could have stations, where each one counts only a particular ballot measure. That would probably be the m
These aren't the reasons we're looking for (Score:3, Informative)
In fact, having a machine that specifically reads voter responses for the purpose of comparing them with the machine's reported voting results might be an EXCELLENT thing. If the tally's don't match, we'd know something was afoot.
How is this a "Death Blow"? (Score:2)
Never let the truth get in the way of a sensational headline
Some background info (Score:2, Informative)
Obligitory Kramer quote (Score:2)
http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheLittleKicks.htm [seinfeldscripts.com]
SMS voting? (Score:3, Insightful)
Think about it. You get the candidates on TV, mebbe have them compete somehow. Have some experts in politics and government ask them questions that the candidates must answer. We can even have them tour the country making public appearances to try and gather support!
And here's the best part: The people actually get to vote for who gets to be President! Just send a text message to 1-800-VOTEUSA and choose your favorite candidate!
Imagine the ratings!
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