Source Code Access Denied in Disputed Race 310
MrMetlHed writes "A judge ruled Friday that congressional aspirant Christine Jennings has no right to examine the source code that runs the electronic voting machines at the center of a disputed Southwest Florida congressional race. From the article: 'The ruling Friday from Judge Gary prevents for now the Jennings camp from being able to use the programming code to try to show voting machines used in Sarasota County malfunctioned. Jennings claims that an unusually large number of undervotes (ballots that didn't show a vote) recorded in the race implies the machines lost the votes.'"
Secret Source Code (Score:1, Funny)
if (Congressman.party == Republican) {
count_vote(Congressman);
}
else {
count_vote(Undecided);
}
Re:Outrageous (Score:2, Funny)
linux code - freely available. Number of linux exploits - minimal.
windows code - closed source. Number of windows exploits - incredible.
There's a pattern here, if only I could put my finger on it...
finally, a black box democracy machine (Score:3, Funny)
Re: Malicious inserted code (Score:3, Funny)
Trade secrets in a voting machine?? (Score:3, Funny)
time to sort out the mess now (Score:4, Funny)
I'm really glad I live in a country that still uses pencil-and-paper votes counted by hand.
Casinos are just rooms full of voting machines (Score:2, Funny)
In that voting is basically a statistical game of chance between two candidates, we ought to be studying gambling machine standards to see the level of security to which voting machines need to be raised. They may call Los Vegas Sin City, but those Nevadans may have written the document that saves our country. Since there is more money made in Vegas yearly (daily?) than is spent in a U.S. national political campaign, voting machines ought to be held to the same standards as the Nevada Gaming Commission's Technical Standards For Gaming Devices and On-Line Slot Systems http://www.gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/techstds_04 dec16_adopted.pdf [nv.gov]
I sincerely doubt any of the voting systems I have heard about come even close! If there is a way to change the program in the machine in the field, a voting machine has already failed this test. They also require the system to detect and record the last 10 changes to its configuration, absorb an ungodly amount of static electricity without malfunctioning and require all unused ROM to be zeroed. . .
A run of the mill slot machine is likely infinitely more secure than a Diebold voting machine and probably a lot more secure than most voting machines.