WI Assembly OKs Voting Paper Trail 197
AdamBLang writes "Madison Wisconsin's Capitol Times reports 'With only four dissenting votes, the state Assembly easily passed a bill that would require that electronic voting machines create a paper record. The goal of the legislation is to make sure that Wisconsin's soon-to-be-purchased touch screen machines create a paper ballot that can be audited to verify election results.' Slashdot has previously reported on this bill." More from the article: "Wisconsin cannot go down the path of states like Florida and Ohio in having elections that the public simply doesn't trust ... By requiring a paper record on every electronic voting machine, we will ensure that not only does your vote matter in Wisconsin, but it also counts."
Good but not great (Score:5, Insightful)
Now If Only.. (Score:5, Insightful)
It makes sense, especially when there were many cases of voter fraud in Milwaukee during the 2004 election. Many votes were cast from addresses that don't exist. Granted, a photo id won't solve all the issues with voter fraud, but neither will a paper trail. Both are still a step in the right direction.
Re:Good but not great (Score:1, Insightful)
Do they make it cheaper? No. So what's the advantage here other than that the CEO of Diebold has his fingers up the ass of some politicians? It's obvious from here that America is corrupt and rotten to the core.
Re:Good but not great (Score:5, Insightful)
Punch cards are really a good way to do a paper trail, as it's visible to the voter, and if there's a dimple or pregnant chad it's clear the voter meant to mark that one. If there's more than one dimple, it's spoiled. In Canada if there's any kind of a mark in the designated area, the ballot is considered valid, it doesn't have to be an X. But if there's marks outside of the Voting O circle for the candidate, then it's bad, or if there's more than one marked. It's not rocket science, it's democracy. Diebold just gets it very, very wrong.
Re:Good but not great (Score:3, Insightful)
Select a group of 10 local voters, at random, and have THEM select 10% of the relevant precints to audit.
Re:Now If Only.. (Score:3, Insightful)
And since it's generally illegal to vote by proxy, forcing the voter to show ID before they vote to prove their identity doesn't add any more anonymity concerns than what the current system already has.
Re:Good but not great (Score:2, Insightful)
We also know that it will only be easier to use some archaic punch card system than simply touching your candidates name and confirming it.
We also know that hanging computer code is a frequent problem, requiring many votes to be discounted regularly.
Also, since many places already use a computer to read analog votes; That doesn't add any extra possibility for error.
In conclusion, what the hell are you ranting about?
I live in Mexico... (Score:5, Insightful)
* "pregnant urns". Before the votes took place, urns were already filled with votes.
* Operation "Carousel" - groups of persons voting twice, or more
* Operation "Tamal" (a tamal is some kind of corn candy kept inside corn leaves). You grab two ballots and fold them, so now you vote for two.
* Operation "Ratón Loco" (crazy mouse). Some guy steals the urns in strategic areas (specially where the opposition is strong) and disappears.
* Vote rewriting. Before impartial organisms counted the votes, the people in charge would alter votes that were against the party in power, and nullify them.
* Dead votes. People who had died managed miraculously to resurrect and vote in favor of the official candidate.
And the most famous of all... (drum rolls, please)
The system crash. In the 1988 elections, after all the ballots were collected, the computer counting the votes suddenly went down, and when the system was up again, the votes now favored the official candidate.
After having to endure all these forms of electoral fraud, laws in Mexico became stricter to make the elections safe from frauds. These laws were promoted and approved, of course, by the opposition congressmen. One of these measures, was the inclusion of photographs in the voting credential (official ID). Another was having a designated area to vote according to your registered address. The voting areas are usually schools or museums, not farther than 5 or 6 blocks from your home.
As a result of all these measures, we finally had a president from the opposition party in 2000.
And it's kinda ironic that we have surpassed the U.S. (whom we had taken as model for transparency and democracy) because of U.S. problems like electronic voting machines, and because we use the popular vote and have more than two political parties.
technophilia (Score:5, Insightful)
fraud happens in all forms of voting mechanisms, and voting is just too much of an important and vulnerable part of our social cohesion and the source of so much faith in and integrity of our government. being so vital and vulnerable, the point in my mind would be to oversimplify the voting process on purpose. the more complex the system, the more points of failure and the more possibilities of fraud. so make the process very simple: paper ballots
i mean seriously, why the technophilia? voting is a problem that is not solved better with more technology, just made more complex. paper ballots i say. the slashdot crowd of any crowd of people should know all about the various and sordid ways malfeasance can be achieved in electronic communication and electronic storage. voting is not a complex math problem. it's very simple. no computer need apply
the slashdot crowd, as technophilic as it is, should know better than any crowd of people why electronic voting can be a downright scary prospect. don't mess with it, simplify it, which means avoiding computers in the voting process like the plague. i'm not a luddite, i am simply saying that specifically in reference to the voting process, it must be simplified technologically to ensure faith and integrity in our government
Re:It's so simple... (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:Now If Only.. (Score:2, Insightful)
What good does this do? (Score:1, Insightful)
Why don't we instead hear about them passing a new law that abolishes the old voter fraud statute and instead puts "intentionally false voting or aiding and abetting the same" as a possible condition for being prosectued for attempting to overthrow the democratically elected government? Seriously, what is voter fraud if not a low level attempt at a coup, especially if it actually changes the outcome of an election?
If there was any justice in this country, anyone convicted of organizing voter fraud would be given life in prison or, depending on the scale executed, and the regular plebes would be slapped with a minimum of a five year felony prison sentence. Of course part of the common excuses that the politicians and workers use is that people show up demanding their right to vote without having registered or that certain groups scream "disenfranchisement!" If you haven't registered to vote, tough luck and if you don't have an ID on you, I don't care what your skin color is, get out of the precinct as you have no right to participate if you won't prove that you're a citizen with the legal right to vote.
Re:What good does this do? (Score:1, Insightful)
Also, can't wait for the point that the US gets so bad that everybody is migrating to Canada. (It could happen!) And then you are the "illegal immigrant". See how you like scrub'n floors, pluck'n chickens, and not being allowed to vote.
Tough luck, buddy.
Paper trail worthless unless voter verifiable (Score:4, Insightful)
HAVA [Help America Vote Act] gives the FEC governance over electronic voting, including establishing source code review procedures for all machines used in a Federal election (read: all voting machines). However, there are so many flaws in the FEC review procedure that it's downright scarry.
1. Coding standards more concerned with technical compliance than correct function. Turns out, the coding standards say more about the correct format of a "for" statement, or the appropriate amount of boilerplate documentation per method, than they do about defining correct operation, error tollerance, or anything else.
2. FEC code review doesn't cover "libraries". Want to include malicous code that only kicks in on the appropriate date, with sufficient voting volume to bury aberation in the noise? Throw it in a library, and use it in the project. Want to be really sneaky? Rebuild an open source library, or some external piece like a database driver or print driver with your malicous code.
3. Fudging alowed in FEC testing. System can't stay stable enough to run 100,000 votes sequentially on a single machine? Throw in automatic application restarts at a set interval into your test harness backend; test harness code isn't reviewed.
4. No enforcement procedure to verify reviewed code is the code running on election day. Not even checksums are required to verify compiled libraries/assmblies/executables are the same as the day they were submitted for review.
5. Reviewer incompetence. FEC reviewers may not be familiar with the language being reviewed. One claimed unequivocally that "length" was a Java keyword, and as such, couldn't be used as a variable name (a glance at the Java spec confirms his mistake). Why? Since it was used without parens like a method call, it must be a keyword.
6. Bogus documentation passes inspection. Don't have all the required class/method/variable documentation for the 2002 standards? Write a comment generator, fix it up a little by hand, and you're set!
OK, so the coding review and coding standards suck. What's that have to do with the voter verifiable paper trail? Everything. Unless the voter can visually check the ballot (and ideally should have to "sign off on it" before the electonic vote is committed), what's to stop hidden/poorly reviewed code from altering the printout *AND* the electronic vode database?
What about the paper receipt being equivelent to a traditional paper ballot? Some voting legeslation only allows the paper ballot to be used for verification, not as a true ballot. So, while you may recount the paper trail, the numbers from the recount are not legally votes, and cannot be used to change the outcome of an election (a fact that would be gleefully used by the conveniently "winning" side in a contested election). The Wisconsin bill does not specify in this matter.
How can we do better? Take a look at the procedure recommended by the Open Voting Consortium http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/>. The *primary* representation of a vote is the printed paper ballot, with a machine readable representation output beside the human readable representation. After voting concludes, each paper ballot is scanned, and compared to the electronic count.
By the way, hope your voting machine vendor has valid source control procedures (like not using a single account for all checkins?), so a malicious contractor can't check in random changes to the code base/libraries. [Evil laughter...]
Re:Now If Only.. (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Actually (Score:3, Insightful)
And how about the obvious fraud in Warren County, where they illegally locked the counting behind closed doors, citing a fake "top-level Homeland Security alert" that was never issued, and for which they never supplied a DHS source? I personally phonebanked Warren County the week before the election, and spoke to a woman who had volunteered at the polling place in years past. She wouldn't say who she would vote for, but I got the impression it was Bush. But she was so disgusted with the total ignorance, incompetence and outright stupidity of the 2004 staff that she refused to help. She was so upset that she shared her anger with me, an anonymous phone pollster. Later in the week I saw the results: a crudely performed fraud while counting Warren's 68K:26K Bush vote, which obviously hid many "extra" state Bush votes in its margin. Then there's the testimony of other poll place volunteers of voting machine reps showing up to tinker with uncounted vote tally cards, along with cheat sheets mounted on walls and advice from the company how to sneak peeks at them to lie to monitoring officials when investigated. Then look at the rest of the fraud committed by Ohio Republicans in charge of the election (itself a basic broken system feature), including the head of the state election doubling as Bush's state campaign chief.
These frauds are all documented - except perhaps my private conversation with the aghast ex poll volunteer. But not in the major press. It's obvious the vote was seriously rigged in Ohio. I'll be willing to look into evidence that votes were rigged in Kerry's favor there, when someone actually produces any shred of actual evidence. But it's obvious that Bush rigged Ohio, that the media is complicit in the coverup, that most of Congress (including Democrats) is complicit in the coverup - except maybe the House Judiciary Democrats and their allies, who have hammered at this fraud with hearings, investigations, evidence, demands for Congressional action, attempted legislation. Even Kerry's unnecessary - and apparently unwarranted - concession, with money in the bank and an army of lawyers, as well as at least 49% of American voters behind him, is complicit. If not in throwing an election, then at least in throwing away the chance to scrutinize and fix our obviously broken system.