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Diebold Flops in Alaska
Posted by
samzenpus
on Thu Aug 24, 2006 02:54 AM
from the they-usually-work-so-well dept.
from the they-usually-work-so-well dept.
lukej writes "From the Anchorage Daily News, During yesterday's preliminary and ballot measure election across Alaska, Diebold built voting machines failed to 'phone home' causing a hand recount. As a party spokesperson said:
"I can say there are many systematic problems with Diebold machines that have been identified in many contexts."
Additionally, the state itself has mandated some hand counts of all electronic results, and the Democratic Party is simply suggesting voters request paper voting."
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Maryland Fights to Keep E-voting 250 comments
crystalattice writes "Apparently Maryland election officials never have computer problems. That's why they're fighting so hard to keep their Diebold e-voting machines. Washington Post reporter Marc Fisher received nothing but bad attitudes, dodges, and excuses when he attempted to discuss the issue with the state elections administration and Diebold." From the article: "I asked the state's elections administrator, Linda Lamone, whether Maryland wasn't just a bit too quick to adopt electronic voting. Doesn't the computer at your desk ever freeze up on you? 'No,' she replied. Never? 'No.' But surely people in your office have had that experience? 'No.' (Maybe we've found the solution to Maryland's voting problem: Everybody head on down to Linda Lamone's office, where the machines work 100 percent of the time.)"
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Nothing will happen (Score:3, Insightful)
He later said: "Of course, they contribute heavily to my party, so its not like we're going to revoke their contract or anything."
Re:Nothing will happen (Score:4, Insightful)
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Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Nothing will happen (Score:5, Informative)
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Seriously guys, (Score:5, Insightful)
All I can say is, those secret election-rigging backdoors must take a lot of work, because what else have their developers been working on?
Re:Seriously guys, (Score:5, Insightful)
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Your solution lacks accessibilty options... (Score:3, Insightful)
It's harder than you might at first think (Score:5, Informative)
The paper ballot is the core - it's in a form and font easy for machine readers to read, but it can also be read by people.
Now, that vote-printer machine can be any machine that has an interface appropriate to the needs of the voter - such as audio driven for sight impaired voters. (A ballot reader would be available to do an audio readback.)
Our proposal is to do this, plus a canvassing system (that's the part that aggregates the precinct counts into the grand totals.)
And we feel that *all* code, and all machinery, should be inspectable and testable by anybody who wants to run a test (and they should be able to publish their test results.) That's one step short of full open source - which doesn't mean that the code couldn't also be open source under one of the licenses.
It is a mistake to think of these things as a software issue - it involves machines (even if they look and smell like PC's, although I personally tend to prefer smaller/lower power engines like the WRAP or Soekris machines) and procedures, lots and lots of procedures (like what to do if a voter walks out in the middle of casting his/her vote - there are laws that say what to do, and they, of course, vary from state to state and even county to county.)
But it is harder to do than one thinks - the machines themselves can't just be any old junk PC. They need to be robust in the face of voter use and tampering behind the scenes. And they need to have lots and lots of places where they can be locked-down (often using things as simple as lead-and-wire tamper seals) to prevent hanky-panky by warehouse or precinct people.
They need to be power-conserving (imagine a precinct with a single circuit breaker/fuse and a flakey or non-existant ground, and that the voting is occuring during a thunderstorm.) UPS's are a pain - they have a high failure rate and given that they often contain a lead-acid battery, are neither lightweight nor quite innocent should they leak. And it's important to keep the fire marshall happy.
And printers are a pure pain in the rear - they can draw a lot of power and are generally the most failure prone part of the system.
And there are lots of legal requirements - like protecting the privacy of the vote. You can, for example, potentially reconstruct which voter voted which way by looking at things like sequencial files used for audit/error-detection or for ballot tallies.
And the stuff has to be easily configurable en masse - counties tend to need hundreds, thousands of these things, and they better all be the same. And they need to be able to be transported by folks who aren't necessarily gentle and set up by people who make your grandmother look like a tech support wizard.
We were planning on doing a project to produce a reference model for such a system via the University of California (multi-campus project with UC Santa Cruz in the project lead position) but we got cut out of California's HAVA (Federal voting act) funding when the previous California Sect'y of State got caught up in a brouhaha on other matters. It's still worth doing - every state would benefit.
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Re:It's harder than you might at first think (Score:4, Interesting)
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Re:It's harder than you might at first think (Score:5, Insightful)
AMEN!
I used to be on the electronic voting bandwagon, but when I saw that it was prone to failure and couldn't be trusted, I jumped off. When machines are reported to carry several thousand votes more than there are registered voters in a precinct, how can ANYBODY say "well, the number isn't enough to change the outcome." How do you know this? What about "errors" that go undiscovered? A little here, a little there, all under the radar so to speak...until you put them all together.
Paper, paper, paper...mark your ballot with a black marker, drop it in a box, and it gets counted by a representative of each party. No electronic storage to deal with, no way to electronically change results, and it's a permanent record.
The only two ways it can fail (that I can think of):
(1) The ballot is a misprint in which case it is simply destroyed (again, witnessed by a representative of each party that it is in fact a defective ballot) and a new, blank one re-issued. The ballot is examined to be defect-free BEFORE being handed to the voter.
(2) The marker runs dry.
The only way there can be fraud is if the votes are tampered with after being deposited; since all ballots are in human-readable form, then the ONLY way to tamper with them is also in human-readable form.
We can process millions upon millions of bank transactions every day but cannot count votes without grotesque errors? Come on people! It's not that hard!
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Re:It's harder than you might at first think (Score:4, Insightful)
Also, paper ballots can only present the choices one way, so there's no possibility for a second-chance "These are the votes you're casting. Are you sure?" step. That's particularly important when the ballot design itself is confusing.
Both of these factors made big news in Florida in 2000, and arguably swung the presidential race. Not that these problems outweigh the problems with electronic machines, but building a fix for old symptoms without solving the underlying problem is a time-honored tradition in the US.
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Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
You make many good points which I agree with, but your first and last sentences above don't jive. We don't process millions of bank transactions daily by pencil and paper, it's done electronically. So if you're against
Re:It's harder than you might at first think (Score:5, Insightful)
People who use that banking system can go back and verify that their transactions went through. They can look at their bank statements and make sure that they're the only ones spending their money.
People who use an electronic voting system cannot go back and verify that their vote was cast correctly. No one can with any system in use in the US. In a paper system, however, you can go back and recount the original paper votes.
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Re:It's harder than you might at first think (Score:5, Interesting)
A proposal for a Trustable Electronic Voting System
Seeing how the failure of electronic voting to earn our trust is a hot topic today, heres my shot at a proposal for a secure electonic voting system.
1. The voting process starts with a voter walking into a polling station and presenting his/her ID. This is verified by the officials, and possibly representatives of the candidates, and once verified, the Voter is issued a Physical Token. This Token is NOT generated on demand, and can be something like the tokens used at game arcades. Each token needs to have a globally unique serial ID, which would need be changeable. Each polling booth is issued a fixed number of voter tokens, enough for the total number of voters expected to show up at a booth. Any unused tokens need to be returned to the Election Authority.
2. The voter takes the token (remmeber that this token is not associated with his identity in any way) and walks up to the voting machine. This machine consists of a touch screen with the poll options on it. The machine activates when the voter drops the token into its slot. The user makes his/her selection, confirms it, and is issued a printed reciept of his/her choice. The machine keeps a running tally of the votes polled, but does NOT communicate the vote to any central server. This information is kept secure inside the machine itself, and the machine needs to be made physcially temper proof and temper-evident. At the end of the polling process, all the voting mashines can be collected together and an authorized elction officer can instruct the machine to reveal the poll results. All results from all machines can be tallied to get the final election result.
4. The receipt format would be a standardized one, established by the febderal election officals, including the fonts, sizes and the information content. It will have on it, printed, the day/date and identifier of the particular election and the id of the machine which issued the reciept, and in large fonts, the selection made by the voter.
5. The voter checks on the reciept to make sure the information on the reciept matches what he had punched in. If not, the vote is invalid, and he/she gets to vote again.
6. If the reciept information is valid, the voter proceeds to another machine, where he/she inserts the reciept into a slot. This second machine reads the receipt using Optical Character Recognition, and maintains its own independent tally of votes polled. It also securely holds all the receipts in a safe vault inside it. The first machine and this second machine are not linked in any way.
7. The first machine and the second machine must not be made by the same manufacturer, or by companies with substantial holding by common entities.
8. Ideally, the token and the receipt would be federal standards, and the machines themselves can be made by any number of companies. They would need to get certified by a testing body. The certification test would focus on standards compliance (including such standards as physical size, accessibility, etc).
9. A single company may make both the machines, but in any specific poll booth, machines from two indepepdent manufacturers need to be used.
At the end of the election, the polling officials return to a central location with all the unused tokens, and the sealed machines. The total number of votes polled by both the machines, and the number of tokens issued is first matched. Then both the machines are activated and the total tallies of votes taken and matched against each other. In case of mismatch, the paper reciepts are retrieved from the second machine, and counted by hand.
The crucial points are:
1. Two independent tallies of the same votes, with a trail between corresponding votes (the receipt carries the token ID, so from the machines databases, one can matc
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Re:It's harder than you might at first think (Score:5, Interesting)
http://www.eci.gov.in/EVM/index.htm [eci.gov.in]
OR
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_voting_machine s [wikipedia.org]
All that you have suggested is already in the machine.
Seems the country that has long been derided as Third-World, dirt Poor, unwashed masses can implement a technologically superior yet simple solution to maintaining Democracy amongst its unwashed masses with highest ethics.
Unless US loses its NIH syndrome, it is bound to be abused by companies like Deibold.
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Re:It's harder than you might at first think (Score:5, Insightful)
We have such a machine in Canada. It works very very well. It's called a number 2 pencil.
No joke. Sometimes technology isn't the answer.
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Re:It's harder than you might at first think (Score:5, Informative)
We have such a machine in Canada. It works very very well. It's called a number 2 pencil.
This always comes up, but Canadians fail to realize just how different American elections are. My typical ballot includes over 50 selections -- I don't mean 50 options for a single race, I mean 50 separate decisions, including national, state, county and municipal officials, plus ballot initiatives, judicial retention votes and others that I can't remember right now.
Many parts of the US do use simple paper ballots, marked with a pencil and tallied by hand. They're areas with small populations, and they're nearly always among the last to report results, because tallying the votes is hard. Sure, it's parallelizable, but with such a long list of individual decisions, it requires much greater parallelism than Canadian elections do, and the large number of races means that combining the separate tallies is also a time-consuming and error-prone process.
Further, paper and pencil has the disadvantage that it excludes many people with disabilities from being able to vote.
Voting machines, designed and implemented correctly, *are* a better way, at least for our style of voting.
Sometimes technology is the answer.
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Re:It's harder than you might at first think (Score:4, Insightful)
Poker machines here in .au have to run firmware which hashes to a number attached to the license of the machine. The hash is made when the machine passes validation and the authorities can at any time go to a machine and check the hash against the ROMS.
As many others have pointed out, this is not rocket science.
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Re:It's harder than you might at first think (Score:4, Insightful)
Hey, there's an idea. Let's let the people who run the casinos build the machines that decide our government. That should be safe.
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Re:Seriously guys, (Score:5, Insightful)
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After a quick glance at slashdot (Score:4, Funny)
Hand count vs. Diebold (Score:5, Insightful)
Concern over the machines led the Alaska Legislature in 2005 to pass a law requiring a mandatory hand count of ballots in one randomly selected precinct in every election district.
Be interesting to hear about how those random hand counts compare to the machine tabulations.
By the way, it'd be nice if slashdotters took notice that a number of the failures were related to phone lines (probably people plugging them into the wrong jacks, digital lines, or lines requiring special dial-out numbers, etc.)
Last but not least:
The Diebold electronic voting machines nationwide have been criticized by voter groups and computer scientists who say they are vulnerable to fraud. Diebold has defended the machines, saying they are secure when elections officials follow proper procedures.
That's the whole point, Diebold: you shouldn't have to "follow proper procedures." The machines should make it impossible to do so, just like I punch a ballot, place it in a box, which is locked and sealed, and taken by police to the counting facility, etc. The current system requires a fair amount of work to interfere with; the Diebold machines seem to require a fair amount of work to NOT interfere with!
Re:Hand count vs. Diebold (Score:5, Insightful)
I'd love to hear the justification from the person who is authorizing this programme.
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Re:Hand count vs. Diebold (Score:4, Informative)
An Aug. 14, 2003 fund-raising letter from Walden O'Dell, chief executive of Diebold sent to the Ohio Republican party said that he is "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year." The letter coincidentally went out the day before Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell (a Republican) was set to qualify Diebold as one of three firms eligible to sell upgraded electronic voting machines to Ohio counties in time for the 2004 election.
http://www.bradblog.com/DieboldContributions.htm [bradblog.com]
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this is the best thing that could have happened (Score:5, Interesting)
Still buggy? (Score:5, Interesting)
So how come they are able to stay in business? Is it the power of the free market?
Re:Still buggy? (Score:5, Insightful)
No! There is no "free market" when the government is the customer. It's all about connections, campaign contributions, whose turn it is (I'll explain that in a minute), and many other distortions. If you accept that it is the role of government to control/regulate free enterprise so as to "smooth the rought edges" of capitalism, then how can that work when the government is also the customer? You have a serious conflict of interest.
As regards "whose turn it is" -- I worked for a defense contractor years ago. We submitted a prototype for a new missile system. Our system met all of the program requirements (size, range, accuracy, cost); plus we won the "shoot off" hands down (our competitor failed to hit a single target). However, our competitor had not won a contract in awhile and neither had any other contractors in their geographic region (ie congressional district). Consequently the contract was awarded to them. This is just one example of what goes on every day with big government contracts. It is hardly what I would call a "free market". Rather, it is more aptly called a "fixed market" - as in, "the fix is in".
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Must have been (Score:3, Funny)
I don't understand (Score:5, Informative)
Speaking as a Euroweenie, I just don't understand the apparent apathy in the USA with regards to the very serious issues surrounding vote counting machines. In a democracy, could anything be more important than making sure that votes are counted correctly and fairly, with a transparent process that can be verified?
Have you seen this, for instance?
http://alternet.org/blogs/video/40755/ [alternet.org]
That was a computer programmer testifying (two years ago) that he'd been asked to write vote rigging software for the Ohio elections. What was the outcome of that? Was there a formal non-partisan enquiry into the elections in Ohio? Was there a huge public protest there? What am I missing?
Same here, as a Canadian I am mystified... (Score:3, Interesting)
We have an almost quaint system of voting here that requires only a few paid volunteers, some paper ballots and a pencil. It's quaintness is offset by its efficiency; I have never waited more than a minute or two to
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
As far as people really not caring, I think that has to do with something completely different. The problem here is the rampant partisan gerrymandering which all but guarantees a victory for most incumbent poli
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
If all that "Democracy" and "US Constitution" stuff the US likes to boast about isn't just bullshit talk, then all the Diebold people involved and their bosses AND the people who approved the machines should be lined up and charged for _treason_.
Tell me why making crappy voting machines AND approving them shouldn't be regarded as treason.
Re:I don't understand (Score:4, Informative)
Where do you get the apathy from? I guarantee you most of the outraged posts here were written by Americans, there has been extensive media coverage of voter machine problems, and investigations by legislative bodies. Also keep in mind that not every state uses Diebold machines, and furthermore some states that do use them don't use them exclusively.
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Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Administered chiefly by incessant American Idol and Fox "news" for the proles, and an institutionally-corrupt political system that makes it abundantly clear that voting is an increasingly pointless action for the intellectuals (who are in any case outvoted by the mindless hordes of Fox-news-watching proles).
I'm in the UK, where the same thing is starting to happen. Tony Blair is slowly removing power from traditional sources and investing it in himself and his cabinet,
On a related note... (Score:5, Interesting)
http://alternet.org/blogs/video/40755/ [alternet.org]
Summary --
Computer programmer Clinton Eugene Curtis testifies under oath before the U.S. House Judiciary Members in Ohio. Stephen Pizzo writes:
A partial transcript:
Are there computer programs that can be used to secretly fix elections?
Yes.
How do you know that to be the case?
Because in October of 2000, I wrote a prototype for Congressman Tom Feeney [R-FL]...
It would rig an election?
It would flip the vote, 51-49. Whoever you wanted it to go to and whichever race you wanted to win.
And would that program that you designed, be something that elections officials... could detect?
They'd never see it.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Imagine the outcry if Deibold makes Coke Vending machines or ATM's like this, where it deducts a penny/dime more randomly from your/bank account.
News At 11.
We would have so many laws passed against this so fast that you would wonder how congress (which usually is as fast as a snail) managed to pass so many laws.
Re:On a related note... (Score:4, Insightful)
This is one of the problems with political commmitee hearings. They are looking for an answer, and tend only to look in the places that give them the answer they want. The testimony concerning Feeney's staffer correcting the course of his work - that Feeney wanted to hide code to rig an election, not to know how to detect sowfware that could rig an election as he had originally provided - could be quite damning. Nonetheless, proof-of-concept viruses are also written by white-hat hackers for new exploits, so it could be entirely on the up and up. Of course, this research should have been made public. Does anyone know how Feeney has voted or testified when confronted with digital ballot machines? Is he publically for or against paper trails?
Witch hunts and lynchings are not my cup of tea, nor should their methods be used in civilized discussions. Sadly, most Americans are too ignorant of computer operation to make an informed decision concerning this type of thing. Even otherwise intellegent people do not understand the technology which goes into software and coding; these are black boxes which operate like a microwave oven or an alarm clock.
Note: I'm a democrat and always have been. I voted against GWB both times. And have had some very nice (unspoken) "I told you so" moments with my wife since 2004 (she's a long time republican and voted for GWB).
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Who's to blame? (Score:4, Interesting)
At least in this case lives were not at risksee here [scotsman.com], here [telegraph.co.uk] and here [128.240.150.127].
It could be argued that selection of companies such as Diebold comes from a lack of awareness of IT by governments, and is simply a cost/saving excercise, but even so- sensible questions should be raised about all contractors- have they got a track record, how are they trialling the product, are their guarantees more than verbal...do we have a backup?
Sure DIebold cannot make excuses...but can the government either?
I am actually happy that elections are rigged... (Score:4, Funny)
But at least we have electronic toilets. (Score:4, Insightful)
Ever think we spend our time perfecting the wrong equipment?
FedEx can do it... (Score:5, Interesting)
The sum of this problem is taking a number, and incrementing it. You must add a pretty, easy to understand interface, and then add a paper trail system.
Here's what I want:
- I walk into a voting center.
- I am asked for ID.
- I present my state Drivers License or Federal Passport for visual inspection.
- In return I'm provided with a re-usable line-tracker token (deli waiting line slip).
- I wait in line to vote.
- I enter the voting booth, surrendering my deli slip to a large box.
- I vote.
- The machine produces three bits of paper; my reciept, my official ballot, and my exit poll token.
- I retain the reciept for my own personal records. It contains no bare words, simply a tracking number, date and time, and location.
- My Official Ballot is dropped into a lockbox of a million similar others, to be stored for eventual hand-recount. It never enters my or anyone elses hands.
- My exit poll token may be presented to exit pollsters, or I may destroy it.
- I enjoy some milk and cookies, and leave.
- Much later, at home, I am able to look up my ballot based on the ID number on my reciept. From this, I can tell where my ballot is, in what box, in what warehouse, what machine I used, what voting center, and the date and time. It may also show what machine was used to process my vote in a recount, or if a hand recount had been done.
- I am able to sleep at night, knowing that democracy will take effect.
This is really not that difficult. Not as difficult as Diebold has made it, and surely not as cloak-and-dagger.Compare this to a Pure Digital camera (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Compare this to a Pure Digital camera (Score:4, Insightful)
When you're in the business of building $30 one-time-use camcorders, and you mistakenly leave your FTP site open with your client-side software on it [digg.com], and some hacker figures out the cipher and the key length, and some other hacker takes that information and performs a clean-room reverse-engineering and writes a little distributed application that results in a third group of enterprising hackers brute-forcing the key within two days, and when you're gracious enough to post a polite request instead of a cease-and-desist [forumer.com], and the people who cracked your hardware are ethical enough to take down the offending code to help keep you in business... things work out pretty nicely. Even if there are a few mirrors of the missing piece of the puzzle floating around on the 'net.
When you're in the business of deciding whether the R-sociopaths or the D-sociopaths gets to govern a trillion-dollar economy, and the source code to the machines that control access to all that money, all that power, and all those guns happens to leak.... probably not so good.
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Re:ted stevens? (Score:4, Informative)
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Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Interesting factoid: Uncle Ted is now t
Re:ted stevens? (Score:5, Informative)
Actually, he's the longest serving senator in the majority party. Robert Byrd is the longest serving senator. Sen. Byrd will become president pro tempore (assuming he is re-elected this fall) if the Democrats ever control the Senate.
Furthermore, for Ted Stevens to become president, Bush, Cheney, and Denny Hastert would all have to die or otherwise be unable to assume the presidency. Come to think of it, he is only two heartbeats away as Cheney doesn't really have a heart, but a sort of robotic device that keeps his oil^H^H^H blood flowing.
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Re:NEW PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH (Score:4, Insightful)
Yes, I realize I'll be modded down offtopic but I thought this type of thinking was worth responding to. Manufacturing jobs will come back to the states as soon as americans are willing to pay for them. You can't cry and make noise about no manufacturing jobs, yet demand the "low low prices" at Walmart caused primarily by asian workers making pennies an hour.
You want American manufacturing jobs back? Be prepared to foot the bill American workers demand.
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Re:Diebold's still around? (Score:4, Insightful)
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Re:Diebold's still around? (Score:5, Informative)
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Re:Diebold's still around? (Score:5, Insightful)
Our politicians are more interested in winning than preserving democracy.
Hence these voting machines.
In US money is more valuable than freedom/democracy. Hence why would we require a very high reliability from ATM, but none from the voting machine?
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